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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper makes the case that discourse analytic approaches in social psychology are not 
adequate to the task of apprehending racism in its bodily, affective and pre-symbolic 
dimensions. We are hence faced with a dilemma: if discursive psychology is inadequate when 
it comes to theorizing ‘pre-discursive’ forms of racism, then any attempts to develop an anti-
racist strategy from such a basis will presumably exhibit the same limitations. Suggesting a 
rapprochement of discursive and psychoanalytic modes of analysis, I argue that Kristeva’s 
theory of abjection provides a means of understanding racism as both historically/socially 
constructed and as existing at powerfully embodied, visceral and subliminal dimensions of 
subjectivity. Kristeva’s theory of abjection provides us with an account of a ‘pre-discursive’ 
(that is, a bodily, affective, pre-symbolic) racism, a form of racism that ‘comes before words’, 
and that is routed through the logics of the body and its anxieties of distinction, separation 
and survival. This theory enables us, moreover, to join together the expulsive reactions of a 
racism of the body to both the personal racism of the ego and the broader discursive racisms 
of the prevailing social order. Moreover, it directs our attention to the fact that discourses of 
racism are always locked into a relationship with ‘pre-discursive’ processes which condition 
and augment every discursive action, which escape the codifications of discourse and which 
drive the urgency of its attempts at containment. 
 
Key words: discourse analysis; racism; affect; bodily experience; psychoanalysis; ‘pre-
discursive’; abjection; hate 
 
 
 
What can we make of the way in which discourses not only constitute the 
domains of the speakable, but are themselves bounded through the 
production of a constitutive outside: the unspeakable, the unsignifiable? 
(Butler, 1997, p. 94). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the white world the man of colour encounters difficulties in the development of his 
bodily schema… My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recoloured, 
clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is ugly, the Negro is animal, the 
Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly…  All around me the white man, 
above the sky tears at its navel, the earth rasps under my feet, and there is a white 
song, a white song. All this whiteness that burns me… (Fanon, 1952, pp. 112-113). 
 
One cannot but notice the prevalence of the body in Fanon’s (1952) Black 
Skin White Masks, black bodies in particular, as they are contrasted against 
insignias of disembodied whiteness. A recurring motif of traumatized 
corporeality grounds the text’s phenomenological concerns with racism and 
reiterates the violent physicality of racism’s colonial forms. The notion of 
‘corporeal malediction’, the disjunction, in other words of a particular corporeal 
schema (of inhabiting a ‘black’ body) in a given historico-racial schema (of the 
racist white world) is offered as a means of conceptualizing the brutal 
psychological effects of racism (Fanon, 1952). The ‘meta-physics’ of racism 
are read into the natural features of a hostile, white world; the hatred of this 
racist world, correspondingly, is read back into the experience of a mutilated, 
radically objectified body. There is something difficult to fathom in this 
disconcerting mismatch of physical and psychological properties: a disjunction 
that obeys no strict demarcation between ideology and bodily experience, 
between the stereotypes of racist discourse and its effects on an embodied 
psychology. More than a phenomenology of the black body, more than a 
corporealization of the psychological violence of racism, Fanon’s writing 
mimics the ‘bodilyness’ of racism, reminding that however advanced its forms, 
racism never loses its localization in the body (see also Gordon, 1997). 
 What I have in mind here, and what this paper is concerned with, is an 
awareness of how racism often manifests as a kind of bodily logic, an 
‘operation of repulsion’ that retraces bodily operations of expulsion at a 
psychological and subsequently symbolic level. I have in mind here a racism 
of fearful bodies, a bodily localization of racial fear that manifests in the 
racist’s violent ‘psycho-visceral’ reactions to the racial other. I, like Fanon, am 
concerned with the virtual omnipresence of the body in racism, but whereas 
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he focuses on the bodily effects/affects of the victim of racism, I seek to 
explore racism as a mode of reactivity that has been routed through the 
dreads, aversions and nausea of the body. My focus, in short, is on an 
embodied form of racism that is played through, and substantiated by, the 
body’s economy of separations and distinctions. Here, following Marion Iris 
Young (1990b), the task is to emphasize that the body must not ‘fall out’ of the 
analysis of racism; we need to apprehend those habituated symptoms of 
avoidance, aversion, disgust or discomfort – bodily reactions, bodily 
symptoms of racism – exactly those evasive structures of oppression that lie 
beneath discursive consciousness. My aim is thus to engage with those facets 
of racism that exceed discursive explanations, to offer a grid of analysis able 
to grasp the irreducibly corporeal aspect of racism. I hope to offer a 
conceptualisation of a form of racism that takes hold, and is fixed as a kind of 
bodily logic that defies rational and discursive logic and that comes to 
assumes a naturalizing bent in the process. What is it about the tenacity of 
prejudice, we might ask, that pre-empts discourse, that routinely disrupts 
attempts at discursive containment?  
 
CRITICAL IMPERATIVES IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RACISM 
 
My objectives here should be contextualized within the frame of critical social 
psychological studies of racism. As suggested above, my particular goal in 
this respect is to make the case for a line of theorization that complements 
discursive/constructionist approaches to the study of racism, a line of 
theorization that may both supplement the critical instruments that this 
perspective has supplied us, and that may direct our attentions to its potential 
blind-spots. Although it may seem unnecessary to rehearse the benefits of the 
discursive approach to the analysis of racism in social psychology, briefly 
doing so helps to situate my argument and to signal my endorsement of such 
an approach. As critics such as Bulhan (1985), Foster (1991, 1999) and 
Howitt & Owusu-Bempah (1994) have noted, attempts within psychology to 
isolate racism to the aberrant subject or to faults of cognition effectively turn a 
problem of social power into a problem of individual psychology. Social 
cognition and self-categorization theories make for two cases in point; these 
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are theories, which, by contrast to discourse analysis, have come to “portray 
prejudice as an inevitable outcome of human cognitive structure” and have 
thereby “excused racists from being accountable for their attitudes and 
behaviours” (Augoustinos & Reynolds, 2001, p. 21). As Leach (2002) has 
pointed out, much classical social psychology views racist activity as “a 
function of weak personality, biased perception or ethnocentric 
categorization…. [ultimately locating] prejudice in the individuated person 
rather than in societal practices and institutions” (p. 440). Such an 
individualizing frame of reference not only absolves society as a whole from 
the responsibility of racism, it also avoids approaching racism as a normative 
condition of a given society, the ideological fiat of which is that racist norms in 
a given society are implicitly normalized (Bulhan, 1985; Dalal, 1998, 2001, 
Howitt & Owusu-Bempah 1994). The discursive conceptualization avoids 
converting the social and political dimensions of racism into a set of internal 
psychological processes – avoids transforming them into the information 
processing mechanisms of individuals, as Henriques (1984) puts it – and as 
such avoids abstracting racist ideation and behavior out of their immediate 
social, structural and institutional environments (Condor, 1988; Edwards, 
2003; Rapley, 1998, 2000; Van der Berg, Wetherell & Houtkoop, 2003; Van 
Dijk, 1987, 1992; Wetherell, 1996; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Importantly then, 
not only does the perspective of discursive psychology endeavor to show how 
racism is linked to processes of social, political and economic domination and 
marginalization, it also sheds light on how such phenomena come to be 
naturalized within society at trans-individual and extra-personal levels (Billig, 
2001; Durrheim & Dixon, 2000;  LeCouteur & Augoustinos, 2002; Verkuyten, 
1997, 1998). These benefits notwithstanding, it remains crucial, even from the 
position of a loyalist, to explore the limitations of such an approach, limitations 
that would appear to center on its inability to conceptualize racism in its least 
‘signifiable’ aspects. I have in mind here a mode of racism not primarily 
representational or institutional in form, a form that is often less than 
conscious or intentional in nature, a racism of immediate response and of 
apparently unmediated affect. This is a racism that need not take verbal form, 
that is realized in impulses, played out in aversions and reactions of the body; 
a racism that appears to remain as of yet unconditioned by discourse.  
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This challenge, I should emphasize, is as theoretical as it is political. It 
is theoretical in as much as racism is a complex and over-determined set of 
phenomena that elude easy, or intuitive, conceptualization. And it is political in 
as much we cannot properly apprehend racism if we have failed to adequately 
understand what sustains it, what lends its potent affective qualities, what 
supports its most visceral aspects. One might refer to Miles (1989) in this 
respect, who, speaking of the relation of theory and practice in the fight 
against racism, notes, “if the analysis is wrong, then it is likely that the political 
strategy will not achieve the intended objectives” (p. 5).  
 
DISCOURSE ANALYTICS AND RACISM  
 
If I am to demonstrate the limitations of discursive approaches to the analysis 
of racism, then I need provide a brief impression of the distinctive 
preoccupations of such approaches. In this respect I mean neither to provide 
an extensive overview, nor to conflate a variety of discursive perspectives that 
maintain important internal differences (for a clearly differentiated synopsis of 
such approaches see LeCouteur & Augoustinos (2001) and Rapley (2001)).   
From the perspective of discursive psychology, racism is to be 
approached “as an interactional, language-based practice” (LeCouteur & 
Augoustinos, 2001, p. 230). The analysis of discourse affords us the 
opportunity, in Rapley’s (2001) terms, to inspect talk, and to thus study how 
“issues of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ are confected, constructed and contested in 
actual social practices” (p. 236). The discursive framework enables us to 
scrutinize the ways in which “realities are constructed and warranted around 
issues of race and ethnicity in…elite, institutional, and everyday, informal talk 
and texts” (LeCouteur & Augoustinos, p. 230). As Wetherell puts it: “In this 
view the derogatory categorizations and group descriptions which form the 
basis of racist talk are best seen as rhetorical and communicative acts rather 
than as perceptual or cognitive phenomena” (Wetherell, 1996, p. 220). 
It is important here that we not lose sight of questions of social and 
institutional practice. An important analysis of racism within South African 
psychology, for example, views racist phenomena as elements of “a set of 
ideas and discursive and material practices aimed at (re)producing and 
 5
justifying systematic inequalities between ‘races’” (Duncan, et al, 2001, p. 2). 
Similarly, Wetherell and Potter’s important (1992) study defines racist 
discourse as that “which has the effect of establishing, sustaining and 
reinforcing oppressive power relations between those defined as racially or 
ethnically different” (p. 70). While their analytical focus is “on meanings, 
conversations, narratives, explanations, accounts and anecdotes” they are 
careful to acknowledge that the study of racism should not be equated merely 
with the study of certain statements of talk and writing: 
 
[R]acism is [not] a simple matter of linguistic practice. Investigations of racism must 
also focus on institutional practices, on discriminatory actions and on social structures 
and social divisions (1992, p. 3). 
 
Van Dijk, another prominent proponent of discourse analysis (1984, 1987, 
1993b, 1998), is similarly cautious not to reduce racism to the analytical 
domain of the textual. Discourse, he (2002) advances, is one type of 
discriminatory practice among others. He provides a delimited definition of 
discourse as “a specific communicative event, in general, and a written or oral 
form of verbal interaction or language use, in particular” (2002, p. 146). It is 
clear from his approach – an approach that favours the technically 
sophisticated analysis of structures of discourse and linguistic devices - that 
racism is bigger than discourse alone: 
 
Theoretically my approach to the discursive reproduction of racism analyzes discourse 
as an interface between macro and micro levels of racism (that is, between racism as a 
system of ethnic group dominance and racism as everyday discriminatory practice), 
between social actions and cognitions (again at the micro and macro levels, namely as 
actions and ideologies of groups or institutions, and as actions and attitudes of social 
members)…such insights should contribute to a broader multidisciplinary study of 
contemporary racism (van Dijk, 1993a, p. 98). 
 
As is apparent from this quote, van Dijk’s approach allows a greater 
consideration of cognitive functioning – memory processes and other social 
cognitions – than does the approach of, say, Potter & Wetherell (1992).  
Miles (1989) provides an important benchmark within the broad range 
of discursive approaches. He defines racism as “a process of signification” (p. 
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3) that works by attributing meanings in a way that creates rigid systems of 
categorization. Here, racism is understood as a specific discourse which 
involves (i) particular representations of real or imagined somatic features and 
(ii) attributions of negatively evaluated characteristics. These processes are 
supported by ‘racialisation’, a dialectical process in which social relations 
between people have been structured by the signification of certain human 
characteristic in ways that construct differentiated social collectivities. Miles 
(1989) insists that “the concept of racism should be used to refer only to what 
can broadly be called an ideology” (p. 3), ideology here understood as 
referring to any discourse that represents human beings and the social 
relations between them in a distorted manner: “ideology is a specific form of 
discourse” (p. 42).  
By limiting the concept of racism, which he asserts must be “defined as 
representational phenomenon” (p. 79), Miles thus runs the risk of textual 
reductionism. This problem stems from his concern that “the concept of 
racism has come to refer not only to imagery and assertions, but also to 
practices, procedures and outcomes, often independent of human 
intentionality and specific ideological content” (p. 3). In fairness, one should 
note that Miles is motivated by the question of analytical accuracy – “the 
analytical value of [the] concept [of racism] is determined by its utility in 
describing and explaining societal processes” (p. 77) - and by the dangers of 
insidiously reifying exactly those discursive entities (‘race’, attributions of 
‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’) that a critical analysis of racism should attempt to 
deconstruct. Regards the first of Miles’ reservations, one can only suggest 
that a different analytical framework needs to be devised exactly so that those 
practices, symptoms and behaviours that seem to be independent of 
intentionality and ideological content can be brought into critical visibility. 
Regarding his second reservation: yes, we must remain constantly vigilant 
that our frame of analysis is able to deconstruct the idea of ‘race’, and that 
terms like ‘race’ are often insidiously essentialized even in our critical 
analytical use thereof. However the fact of the constructed nature of such 
categories does not mean that we should foreclose supplementary (non-
discursive) forms of analysis that offer different explanatory routes to just how 
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such constructions are consolidated and substantiated at ‘pre-discursive’ 
levels. 
Clearly then, not all discursive conceptualizations are as prone to 
reducing racism to the textual, that is, to acts of representation, to rhetoric, to 
signification. Nevertheless, one might counter, there remains, perhaps as an 
inherent tendency of discourse methodology, the risk of a reduction to talk, 
and with it, an overwhelming analytical prioritisation of words and 
significations over and above contexts, institutions and associated social 
practices. This is the gist of Hammersley’s (2003) critique of the 
“methodological severity” of much discourse analysis (see also Nightingale & 
Cromby (1999) on the problems of reducing social life to linguistic or verbal 
phenomena). Whether the frame of discourse analysis is extended ‘outwards’ 
so as to include issues of social structure and material practice, or ‘inwards’ to 
consider more carefully the role of cognitive functioning – each of which, one 
might argue, cannot be directly accessed through the critical scrutiny of texts 
– there are at least three fundamental factors of racism which remain 
conspicuously absent. These are factors, emphasized in my opening 
reference to Fanon, that remain fundamental to the lived experience of 
racism: embodiment, affect, and that experiential domain that we may refer to 
as the ‘pre-discursive’, i.e. that which comes before words, that which is not 
easily contained or assimilated into the symbolic domain of speech, language, 
signification. (In what follows I will refer to these three factors collectively with 
the label of ‘pre-discursive racism’).  
Each of these factors remains crucial in Fanon’s pained and frequently 
lyrical, indeed, poetic attempts to illustrate the more visceral devices of 
racism. They remain, however, absent from the analytical work of the above 
analysts, precluded from an epistemological frame that prioritizes textual data. 
None of this is to deny that there is much to be gained from a line of scrutiny 
that recontextualizes the ostensibly extra-discursive - the body, the domain of 
emotion, insidious social significations, and so on – through a textual lens, 
thus demonstrating their historical and ideological locations within the world of 
representation. As Foucault (1981) advances, the showing up of the 
discursive qualities of the supposedly extra-discursive remains an urgent 
critical exercise (see Hook, 2001). This notwithstanding, it would seem that 
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there are serious limitations to a mode of critical social psychology which a) 
hopes to analyse social phenomena exclusively within a textual frame, b) 
neglects those insidious factors of racism that I have highlighted above, 
preferring to grapple only with those phenomena of racism that can be 
accessed with the tools of discursive scrutiny.  
 
RACISM BEYOND WORDS 
 
Racism, I have recently argued, is a phenomenon that is as psychological as 
it is political, affective as discursive, subjective as ideological (Hook, 2005a). 
As a series of authors have recently cautioned, we cannot explain prejudice 
and bigotry as merely sets of representational content, as simply the effects of 
asymmetrical social structure, as only conscious beliefs and political effects 
(Cheng, 2000; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000; Žižek, 1998). For Lane (1998), 
racism’s irrational forms “elude explanation by sole reference to either 
conscious precepts or social history” (p. 2). Shepherdson (1998), similarly 
concerned with the limits of constructionism and historicism, questions 
whether issues of ‘race’ can be adequately grasped as only a matter of 
“discursive effect or…purely through symbolic formation” (p. 44). The full 
significance of the concept of ‘race’, he (1998) argues, remains irreducible to 
the analysis of historical and discursive context; to understand racism we 
need in addition an awareness of the psychical representations of ‘race’, only 
then can the peculiar tenacity of this concept be addressed. Winnubst (2004) 
extends this observation by noting that psychoanalytic theory provides the 
tools with which to answer “what social constructionist approaches assume 
but never adequately account for”, namely the fact of “how race attaches to 
individual bodies and psyche…while simultaneously operating through a 
trans-social logic” (p. 43). Her criticism of social constructionist/discursive 
approaches is blunt: 
 
[I]f it is though the embodiment of race that racism works, then the conception that race 
is socially constructed is, in its ability to articulate the complex processes of 
embodiment, insufficient to diagnose the mechanisms and structures of racism 
(Winnubst, 2004, p. 43). 
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Psychoanalysis, she proclaims, provides opportunities to articulate how race 
is historically and socially constructed and yet, nevertheless, individually 
embodied. Clarke (2003) expresses similar reservations over the recent 
preponderance of sociological/discursive analyses of racism, many of which 
fail, in his estimation, to address a series of core issues: 
 
[F]irst, the ubiquity of forms of discrimination and the affective component of hatred; 
second…the sheer rapidity, the explosive, almost eruptive quality of ethnic hatred… 
Third…the visceral and embodied nature of racism… Finally, the psychological 
structuring of discrimination…the psychological mechanisms that provide the impetus 
for people to hate each other (2003, pp. 2-3, my emphasis). 
 
What unites all of these accounts is the imperative to account for what 
Selznick & Steinberg (1969) have called ‘the tenacity of prejudice’, that is, 
racism’s notorious recalcitrance in the face of historical, discursive and 
institutional change. To paraphrase Lane (1998): conventional emphasis on 
racism’s material and discursive history tends to ignore this phenomenon’s 
impalpable forms; to consider racism as merely the outcome of “cultural 
fixation or residue of historical prejudice is not sufficiently helpful” (p. 3) he 
advances. “It remains for us to interpret this phenomenon’s astonishing 
intransigence” (Lane, 1998, p. 3), to grapple with racism uncanny logic of 
return, as Žižek (1998) puts it, with the fact of apparently growing levels of 
intolerance, racist hostility and hatred even in societies where equality and 
democracy have become enshrined ideals.  
 
PSYCHOANALYSIS IN POLITICAL MODE 
 
To adopt a psychoanalytic perspective is not to relegate discussions of racism 
to the register of the singular, to condemn them to irretrievably individualistic 
modes of conceptualization. Neither is it to fix the topic of racism within a 
‘vernacular of deviancy’ which views racist phenomenon as no more than a 
psychopathological form, or as the maladjustment of isolated subjects.  This is 
not to say that earlier psychoanalytic engagements with racism have not been 
guilty of both such reductionisms, of thinking racism as effect and expression 
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of internal psychological dynamics (firstly) and/or attempting the 
‘pseudoconcrete’ application of specific clinical categories (paranoia, 
compulsive neurosis, hysteria, etc.) to racist phenomena (secondly) (see 
Dalal (2001) for a definitive critique of such trends in the history of 
psychoanalytic conceptualization, but also Cohen (2002) and Frosh (1989) for 
thorough critical overviews of psychoanalytic engagements with racism). As 
hardly needs reiterating: these are trends of analysis that we should be 
constantly vigilant of if we are to apply psychoanalysis in a political mode and 
direct it towards the agenda of social critique. We likewise need remain aware 
of a series of standard criticisms aimed at psychoanalysis as “a discourse of 
modernist, bourgeois, European origins” which has all often “tended to 
describe psychology in terms of universal frameworks that ignore cultural and 
historical specificity” (Bergner, 1999, p. 222). By making universalizing 
assumptions of this sort, by perpetuating Western assumptions of its own 
origin and remaining unaware of its own ideological complicities, 
psychoanalysis has certainly been applied in ways which legitimate/naturalize 
versions of oppressive politics (Cohen, 2002; Winnubst, 2004). Critiques of 
this sort have been well documented, particularly in reference to postcolonial 
theory (Campbell, 2000; Khanna, 2003; Macey, 2000b; Moore-Gilbert; 1997; 
Young, 2004) and critical studies of race, gender and class (Abel, 1990; 
Bergner, 1999; McCulloch, 1983; Pajaczkowska & Young, 1999; Rustin, 1991; 
Spillers, 1996), two general domains of study in which the call for a 
‘rehabilitated’ application of psychoanalytic theory has been at its strongest.  
 A cross-section of recent psychoanalytic work on the topic of racism 
(Bhabha, 1994; Cheng, 2000; Clarke, 2000, 2003; Hook, 2005b; Riggs & 
Augoustinos, 2004; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000; Winnubst, 2004; Žižek, 1998) 
avoids the above pitfalls of de-contextualization and psychological 
reductionism. Work of this sort has situated itself explicitly in the field of social 
and political commentary (rather than remaining within the individualizing 
realm of clinical diagnostics) and has focused its attentions on the 
interrelations between desire, fantasy, affect (on one hand) and questions of 
social/symbolic structure (on the other). Such critical applications of 
psychoanalytic theory have remained attentive to the interpenetration of 
psychological and structural factors, focusing on the “complex and often 
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painful transactions between the psychic and the social” in the words of 
Pajaczkowska & Young (1999, p. 198), aware that psychological operations 
(identification, disavowal, projection, desire) do not occur in a historical 
vacuum or beyond the reach of forceful discursive practices. 
 In the introduction to The Psychoanalysis of Race, Christopher Lane 
(1998) retorts to claims that psychoanalysis is a necessarily ahistorical or 
depoliticizing instrument of analysis. “What could be more political than of 
fantasy” he asks, “when it determines the fate of entire communities, nations, 
even continents” (p. 7). More directly yet: “We cannot comprehend ethnic and 
racial disputes without considering the implications of psychic resistance”, or 
unless we “engage critically with the fantasies organizing the meaning of 
racial and ethnic identities” (1998, p. 1). What is required then, to summarize 
the mode of critique I am advocating, is neither an account that looks simply 
to isolated subjects themselves, in a way that is cut off from the historical and 
symbolic realms they occupy, nor a focus on those symbolic structures 
abstracted out of their relationship with human subjects. We need instead to 
understand something of “the complicated relationship between subjects and 
their symbolic structures” (Lane, 1998, p. 2). 
 
RAPPROACHEMENTS OF DISCURSIVE &PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICISM 
 
Psychoanalysis would seem to have particular bearing on our current focus of 
‘pre-discursive’ racism, certainly inasmuch as it understands the body as a 
‘surface of experience’ from which the ego gradually emerges, and certainly 
given the attention it pays to pre-symbolic, affective and unconscious modes 
of experience. My intention – to be quite clear – is not to simply replace 
discursive/constructionist understandings of racism with those of 
psychoanalysis. I am arguing, by contrast, for a strategic rapprochement of 
discursive and psychoanalytic frames. I mean this not in the sense of simply 
assimilating the terms of one system into the theoretical frame of the other - 
as in the case of Billig’s (1999) attempt to reformulate the idea of repression 
within the theoretical vocabulary of discursive psychology - but rather in the 
vein suggested by Henriques et al (1984) in Changing the Subject. Venn 
motivates in this text for “a theory of discourse which recognizes the 
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investment of power and desire in the discursive process” (p. 151). This, 
clearly is not to recommend an unconditional endorsement of all 
psychoanalytic conceptualisations; rather it is to make the claim that the 
“domain of the unconscious, of invisible desires and feelings is central to any 
account of subjectivity” (p. 151).  
One cautious example of such a rapprochement might be seen in Rose 
(1982), who discusses how social regulation is frequently managed via the 
register of desires and through the instrumentalization of pleasure. Adams 
(1982) similarly raises the question of an analytics of desire as a crucial 
aspect of social critique. Although discursively produced, and requiring social 
and historical contextualization, the issue of desire – like that of fantasy, 
anxieties, and deep-set fears - remains a important factor in the explanation of 
social power (Adams, 1982). A more sustained reference to psychoanalytic 
theory as a means of reading power is to be found in Homi Bhabha’s (1994) 
scrutiny of colonial discourse, particularly in his influential elaboration of the 
racist stereotype as following the logic of fetishism (for an expository 
treatment see Hook (2005b)). Seshadri-Cooks (2000) likewise draws on 
psychoanalysis as means of tackling the persistence of the discourse of race; 
she utilizes Lacanian notions of sexual difference to posit whiteness as a 
‘master signifier’ around which a racist system of differences comes to be 
organized. Khanna (2003), similarly aware of the problematic universalism of 
much psychoanalysis, nevertheless insists on its importance “as a reading 
practice that makes visible the psychical strife of colonial and postcolonial 
modernity” (p. 2). Riggs (2005) takes up a similar approach in advancing the 
prospects of psychoanalysis as a ‘post-colonising’ reading practice able to 
render visible foundations of white belonging, and their relation to ongoing 
acts of colonial violence. (For examples of social psychological applications of 
psychoanalysis in discourse analytic treatments of racist texts, see Billig 1997; 
Frosh, 2002; Frosh, Phoenix & Patman, 2000; Riggs & Augoustinos, 2004; for 
discussion of psychoanalysis as a means of reading texts, see Parker 1997a, 
1997b, 2002).  
To be sure, what is involved in rapprochements of this sort is not merely 
the critical or historical contextualization of psychoanalysis; what is required, 
by contrast, is speculation “about how particular discourses set parameters 
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through which desire is produced, regulated and channelled” (Henriques et al, 
1984, p. 220). This is a two-way process. The content of desires - like that of 
particular anxieties, phobias and depressions - must be viewed as neither 
timeless nor arbitrary, rather as historically specific, contingent upon a 
backdrop of particular discursive practices. However, the discursive-historical 
frame must not simply dominate the analysis; to do so relegates the unique 
explanatory potential of psychoanalysis to a descriptive role within discursive 
theory. As Henriques et al (1984) argue, the positioning produced through the 
force of such discursive practices will in itself provide only a partial answer to 
how power intersects with subjectivity: 
 
[T]he relation between the workings of the unconscious of any particular [subject] with 
respect to positions in any particular practice is not one of simple recognition and 
acceptance. That is, we need to understand the motivational basis through which such 
an uptake [of discourse within unconscious desire] is produced (Henriques et al (1984), 
p. 222, my emphasis). 
 
What is equally called for thus is an explication of how discursive relations 
enter, and become reciprocally intertwined with, the production of the 
‘faculties’ of desire, fear, anxiety, and fantasy in the first place (Henriques et 
al, 1984). The double imperative here, to reiterate, is to investigate how power 
and desire (or fear, anxiety, fantasy) are simultaneously produced (firstly) and 
produced at least partly within the machinery of a subjectivity that is not 
entirely accessible to rational discursive consciousness (secondly). Such a 
description provides the precise co-ordinates within which I would place the 
objectives of this paper. I though am more concerned with the underside of 
desire, with the operation of fear in its most radically affective, embodied and 
pre-symbolic capacities, indeed, with the simultaneous production of power 
and fear, with how discourse enters into and becomes consolidated at the 
level of ‘pre-discursive’ mechanisms of subjectivity.  
 
RACISM AND ABJECTION  
 
What is called for then is an account of embodiment and affect that entails a 
strong social and political dimension, and that is able to explain something 
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about pre-symbolic (or visceral) reactivity. The particular theory I have in mind 
is Kristeva’s (1982) notion of abjection, a psychoanalytic account that has 
been utilized precisely as means of challenging the explanatory limitations of 
social constructionist/discursive accounts of experience (Foster, 1996; Hook, 
2002). Oliver (1993) has made use of the concept precisely as means of 
pointing out an ontological domain that both precedes and exists in opposition 
to the realm of language and the ‘symbolic’. (The ‘symbolic’ here refers to the 
broad realm of social order, signification and law that makes discourse 
possible). The body is indispensable in this theory; the ego is never wholly 
autonomous its corporeal basis - indeed, it is the body within this account 
which stakes out the limits not only to the physical experience of the subject, 
but to social identity as well. Based as it is on such a prioritisation of the body, 
the theory of abjection offers an extraordinary set of insights not only into the 
‘physicality’ of the phenomena of racism – its bodily fascinations and 
anxieties, the visceral quality of its most primal reactions - but also into the 
linked qualities of psychological and indeed symbolic survival that seems to 
underwrite its affects. This is a mode of explanation, furthermore, that 
endeavours to grapple with the extremities of non-verbal experience. It tries to 
grasp the depth of hatred that racism is able to incur, to understand the threat 
to body, ego and culture that such a formulation of affect seems able to 
consecrate. Based, as it is on a constitutive kind of fear, on a form of horror 
that is at the same time a kind of incoherence and dissolution, the notion of 
abjection enables us to think a theory of racism that is based on boundary 
threats, on threats to the physical, psychological and symbolic integrity of the 
racist subject.  
It is important to signal from the outset that this is as much a social 
theory as it is a psychological theory of embodiment. Kristeva’s (1982) 
discussion of abjection presents us with an interesting interchange of 
influences: it is based as much on Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis as it is 
on Douglas’s groundbreaking study of cleanliness and defilement, Purity and 
Danger (2002), whose anthropological and sociological insights Kristeva 
rearticulates, as Grosz (1994) notes, within a psychological and subjective 
register. Moreover, Kristeva’s theorization of abjection, much like Fanon’s own 
strategic use of psychoanalysis, might be said to be concerned with how 
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psychoanalysis itself has ‘sublimated’ questions of politics and racism. Neither 
Fanon nor Kristeva extends an orthodox version of psychoanalysis; both in 
fact query certain of its fundamental suppositions. The analytical efforts of 
both writers make us aware that despite powerful unconscious factors, racism 
is not something that can be adequately understood merely at this level, that 
indeed, racism is also worn on the surface of consciousness.  
The theory of abjection has been surprisingly under-utilized in 
theorizing racism – with the notable exception of Oliver (1993, 2000)) - 
especially so within the domain of social psychology. It is true that Young 
(1990a, 1990b) makes some useful comments connecting abjection to racism, 
but she, like others who refer to the term in a chiefly descriptive rather than 
analytical capacity (see for example McClintock, 1995), offers no sustained 
discussion of the conceptual and political utility of the underlying theoretical 
basis of the notion. This is my objective in what follows, an exposition of 
central tenets of the notion of abjection with a view to commenting on how 
applications of this concept may enlarge the field of critical social 
psychological analyses of racism. 
 
A DYNAMICS OF DEGREDATION 
 
The literal meaning of abjection (in Latin ab-jicere) is to cast off, or out. In 
speaking of the abject we have in mind the contemptible, the repugnant, the 
wretched, that which is unwanted, filthy, contaminating. In Butler’s (1990) 
terms, the abject, at its most literal, designates “that which has been expelled 
from the body, discharged as excrement, literally rendered “Other” (p. 169).  
“Degradation, as state and purpose”, as Herbst (1999) puts it, “lies at the core 
of the term ‘abject’” (p. 15). Abjection then, as verb, should be understood as 
an operation: the powerful visceral reaction to a given stimulus that is then 
denigrated, rejected, expelled. The abject, on the other hand, as noun, should 
be understood as the apparent source of such reactions and affects, that 
abhorrent, uncontained and indefinable ‘thing’ which elicits avoidance, 
repulsion, sickness, disgust.  
  Abjection, to be sure, is a forceful reaction, one that entails responses 
of expulsion and denigration. It is this level that Butler (1993) has in mind 
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when she refers to abjection as an ‘operation of repulsion’. Both a form of 
recoil and of response, of repugnance and of reflex action, abjection, it should 
be remembered is always activity, action as much as it is disgust. There is an 
immanent relation to action in the subject who experiences abjection, an 
immanent relation to a variety of demonstrative acts and potential violences, 
symbolic or otherwise, that will keep the source of abjection at bay. What is it 
though that gives rise to abjection? Those experiences, simply put, in which 
one undergoes the unsettling sensation of not being able to distinguish ‘me’ 
from ‘not me’. Abjection as such is a ‘border-anxiety’; an urgent response that 
arises in order to separate one’s self from what is perceived to be a 
contaminating quality, a quality that threatens the distinctions of self. 
The abject, insists Kristeva (1982) is not directly knowable. One 
detects its presence chiefly by virtue of the visceral, indeed, the bodily 
responses it induces - palpable anxieties of disgust, avoidance, and repulsion. 
Clearly this is not a primarily discursive sensibility; we are not here concerned 
with racism as a form of “knowledge”, but rather with a “primal” response that 
pre-empts (and sometimes overrides) such discursive responses. The abject 
is above all that which threatens, that which plagues and disturbs identity, 
system and structure. What we see in responses of abjection is the desperate 
attempt to reaffirm a kind of ego-coherence, an attempt loaded with the 
exaggerated affect that comes with the reflex urgency of the wish to divide 
self from the other.  
 The original and primary ‘surface’ of the abject’s realization is the body.  
For psychoanalysis, as is well known, the body is the multi-zonal site for the 
earliest instances of cultural exchange and socialization, the template for the 
developing ego; “the boundaries of the body”, after all, “are also the first 
contours of the subject” as Butler (1990, p. 169) puts it. Amongst the most 
primal (and powerful) abject “objects” (or stimuli) are those items that 
challenge the integrity of one’s own bodily parameters – blood, urine, feces, 
etc. – those bodily products once undeniably a part of me that have become 
separate, loathsome. These detachable parts of the body 
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retain something of the cathexis and value of a body part even when they are separated from the 
body. There is still something of the subject bound up with them – which is why they are objects 
of disgust, loathing, and repulsion as well as envy and desire (Grosz, 1994, p. 81). 
 
Two points should be made here. Abjection is always the flipside of desire; 
there is always a prospective intimacy and attraction to that socially 
undesirable quality that comes to be classed as abject (hence the strength 
and imperative of the reflex to expel). Secondly: the experience of abjection is 
never complete. The ego’s attempt to achieve autonomy through separation-
individuation is always a struggle against exactly those borderline “objects” 
that defy me/not-me categorization and that threaten to dissolve the integrity 
and separateness of ‘self’ along with the broader social system of identity of 
which it is part. The notion of abjection always carries with it the element of 
crisis: “Taken to its logical consequences, it is an impossible assemblage of 
elements, with a connotation of a fragile limit” (Kristeva, 1988, p. 135-136). 
This draws us to the realization that, at some level, abjection remains an 
impossible process, something that is not lost on the subject. As Kristeva 
comments, abjection is “a revolt of the person against an external menace…a 
desire for separation, for becoming autonomous and also the feeling of 
impossibility of doing so” (1988, p.136), hence the desperation, one might 
suggest, of the incessantly repetitive practices of abjection. 
 
ABJECTION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
 
In abjection then we have something like a ‘force-field’ of identity, one in 
which two particularly potent sets of affect - hate and fear – exist in 
combination. They are intertwined in a protective way, so as to secure the 
integrity of a given structure, be it bodily, psychical or social in nature. Why 
this potential line of explanation is so pertinent is that it gives us some grasp 
on what often seems the most difficult quality of racism to understand: the 
sheer and unswayable irrationality of the fear and of the hatred directed at the 
‘racial other’. This is one quality discursive accounts struggle to explain, the 
very ‘why’ of extreme irrational racist affectivity (the ‘costs’ of affectivity that is, 
even in the absence of any rational, discursive or material gain). Importantly 
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however, the affectivity that the notion of abjection hopes to explain does not 
remain at a solely psychological level of conceptualisation. Abjection is a 
forceful physical, psychical and symbolic response, an expulsive reaction on 
all of these levels, a violent attempt at restitution of an apparent affront to 
wholeness be it of the body, of identity, of socio-symbolic structure. Hence 
Kristeva’s description of abjection as “an extremely strong feeling which is at 
once somatic and symbolic” (1988, pp. 135-136).  Further yet: 
 
Abjection is coextensive with the social and symbolic order, on the individual as well 
as…the collective level…one encounters it as soon as the symbolic and/or social 
dimension of man is constituted…abjection assumes specific shapes and different 
codings according to the various “symbolic systems” (1982, p. 68). 
 
The ontology of the social Kristeva utilizes here - perhaps unusually for many 
orthodox forms of psychoanalysis - does not prioritize individual complexes 
above the consideration of history, culture, social forces. Indeed, abjection, as 
both process and condition, occurs typically in unison with and as means of 
recapitulating the existing social formation: 
 
The process of abjecting [an operation]…is an active one in which one party rejects, 
banishes, degrades or in some way denigrates another party; the state of being abject 
[a condition]…is what follows an act of abjection: it is a disposition, a place of 
exclusion… Without exception, the party that does the abjecting is the one in a position 
of power…while the one degraded is robbed of power and the right to societal inclusion 
(Herbst, 1999, p. 16). 
 
Butler (1993) makes the same point when she asserts “the notion of abjection 
designates a degraded or cast out status within the terms of sociality” (p. 53).  
As I hope is becoming clear then, the ‘pre-discursive’ bodily rationalities of 
abjection provide us with a series of ‘instinctive’ reactions upon which 
particular political logics may be transposed. Here we may identify a link to 
broader sociological and social constructionist accounts. Onto the seemingly 
natural order of divisions and distinctions that occurs along the parameters of 
the body (and ego) we may be able to discern a distinctive trace, the 
imposition that is of a series of constructed differentiations between subject 
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and abject, differentiations that would hence hope to attain a kind of corporeal 
objectivity, a kind of primary ontology. This would seem to tell us something 
about the pernicious and deep-seated qualities of certain forms of racism: 
what we have here is a form of racism that has been encoded into a set of 
‘sub-discursive’ bodily responses, a racism, put differently, that has been 
written into a natural series of physical reflexes and divisions. 
The compatibility of the notion of abjection with 
constructionist/discursive accounts is crucial here: there is no one ‘primordial’ 
or original abject. Abjection, for Kristeva (1982) possesses no intrinsic object. 
As Weiss (1999) emphasizes, the abject is that intolerable, contaminating 
thing, that historically-variable ‘entity of threat’ that can include “other 
people…an infinite number of phenomena” (p. 57). Concurring, Butler (1993), 
uses the notion of the abject to designate “uninhabitable” and “unliveable” 
zones of social life - zones populated by those who do not qualify as full 
subjects of that particular social order - whose function is to circumscribe the 
domain of those who do qualify as full subjects. There can, in short, be no 
abject other than that which is socially determined. Adding to this, it is 
important to note that the abject is always an abstract quality, transferable 
along the lines of family likeness across a variety of objects. This poses 
considerable complications for the ego: the abject “thing” cannot simply be 
subsumed into the dialectics of self-other, ego-object strategies of 
identification.  
The abject is precisely that which continually disallows the prospects of 
any correlative objects, symbolic or otherwise, through which “I” would be able 
to assume a kind of detachment and autonomy. Any number of possible 
objects, people or environments across an unspecified yet limited grid of 
associations may ‘manifest’ the abject for the subject; a fact that helps us in 
grasping something of the generalizability of racist sentiment. This is a useful 
consideration in view of the associability of racial hatred across a broad 
variety of apparent characteristics of the ‘racial other’. The notion of abjection, 
in other words, understands that the ‘logics’ of hate of racism needs no 
definitive or singular object; there is no one single feature, rather multiple 
shifting elements of ‘blackness’ (to take Fanon’s (1952) example), each of 
which is ‘abjectionable’ for the white racist. I should note here that the 
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underlying grid of such associations is not itself ‘pre-discursive’, but is instead 
necessarily supplied by a social sphere of political values and norms, by 
discourse. This though is not to say that the immediacy of affect and response 
in abjection is not - after the fact of socialization – experienced in a ‘pre-
discursive’ way, routed that is, along ‘pre-discursive’ channels. (It is for this 
reason that I use scare-quotes throughout in referring to the ‘pre-discursive’, 
so as to acknowledge the practical difficulty of separating the (discursive) 
contents of racism from the affective, bodily and pre-symbolic processes that 
inscribe its values in a seemingly ‘pre-discursive’ capacity). 
The underlying threat of the abject for Kristeva (1982) is the threat of 
death. The abject is always associated with some kind of deathliness, she 
insists, it always evokes the primal fear of the ultimate dissolution of ego. This 
gives us an appreciation of the emotional stakes in processes of abjection; the 
volatility of such phenomenon - as would seem to be the case in forms of 
racism – stems from the fact that a potential dissolution of subjectivity is 
apparently being threatened, a kind of wiping away of the individual 
coherence of the subject. The direness of this threat must be understood in 
conjunction with the role abjection plays in the constitution of human 
subjectivity. Butler (1989) here makes an important contribution in her 
Foucauldian critique of Kristeva’s theory - which at times, she claims, drifts 
towards a solely negativist conception of power – emphasizing that within any 
given social formation abjection must function as an integral productive aspect 
of identity. So, abjection, for Butler, even whilst always associated with the 
threat of dissolution, is always equally concerned with a project of self-
definition, with the task of ego-construction (the substantiation of identity, in 
other words), processes that are of course taken up and consolidated at the 
level of social structure. In understanding abjection we need prioritise not only 
the ‘threatening outside’, but also the role of a ‘loathsome inside’, those 
elements of the self that must be ejected. The productive processes by which 
subjects are formed, she insists – and the pertinence of her description to the 
dynamics of racism here is obvious - requires the “simultaneous production of 
a domain of abject beings…who are not yet “subjects,” but who form the 
constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” (Butler, 1993, p. 3). This 
zone of uninhabitability   
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 constitute[s] the defining limit of the subject’s domain; it will constitute that site of 
dreaded identification against which – and by virtue of which – the domain of the 
subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to life…the subject is 
constituted through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a 
constitute outside to the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, “inside” the 
subject as its own founding repudiation (Butler, 1993, p. 3). 
 
We best grasp these dynamics of subject constitution once we have 
understood the nature of the relationship between the processes of abjection, 
on one hand, and the structure of the symbolic, on the other. The theory of 
abjection, that is to say, is also an account of the means by which a subject 
takes on a speaking position within the world of language, law and culture that 
Kristeva understands as the symbolic. Here I would argue that we take the 
lead of Winnubst (2004) who prefers to speak about a specific and 
historicized cultural domain – the ‘cultural symbolic’ - rather than to slip into 
abstract descriptions of the universal structure of language. (The political 
values and institutionalised norms of white South African during the apartheid 
regime provides us with a prospective example of such a ‘cultural symbolic’). 
If we do this, we have at our disposal a theory of enculturation that may be 
adapted to tell us something about the processes through which subjects 
come to be differentiated in particular historical and discursive locations. 
Moreover, we will have a theory able to tell us something about the violent 
dynamics that lend a degree of fixity (that is, rigidity, a ‘buttoning-down’ of 
subjectification) to the positioning of subjects within given discursive regimes  
 
SEMIOTIC AND SYMBOLIC 
 
Although I prefer not to delve too deeply into the details of Kristeva’s account 
of infant development (for an authoritative accounts see Gross, 1990a; Grosz, 
1989; also Lechte, 1990; Oliver, 1993), it is useful to briefly refer to her 
distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic. Each of these categories 
refers to a distinct dimension of subjectivity that Kristeva takes to be 
foundational to all speaking subjects. The developmental progress of each 
such subject, she argues, involves the necessary transition from a type of 
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subjectivity governed by the former to a subjectivity governed by the latter: it 
is in the course of this transition that the abject first arises.  
The idea of the semiotic is best grasped as the realm of experience 
that occurs prior to the acquisition of language. Whereas the symbolic is the 
conscious law-based and language-founded domain of structure and 
difference, the semiotic is an element of the pre-verbal and subsequently 
repressed unconscious. Gross (1990a) describes the semiotic as a murky, 
undifferentiated and narcissistic realm characterized by the lack of distinct 
borders and clear separations. In the earliest months of life the infant is 
thought to form a syncretic unity with the mother, and is as such unable to 
distinguish between itself and its environment, possessing no awareness of its 
own corporeal boundaries. The child as such is ubiquitous “with no separation 
between itself and ‘objects’…it forms a ‘primal unity’ with its objects” (Gross, 
1990b, p. 34). For Kristeva (1982), this state speaks of the necessity of the 
mechanism of abjection (as primal process of division, demarcation, 
exclusion) to the formation of self-other relations, to the basic acquisition of 
language, and ultimately, to the (relative) stabilization of identity in a particular 
‘cultural symbolic’. Macey (2000a) concurs: abjection succeeds in 
“establishing bodily boundaries by facilitating the introduction between the 
inner and outer…between the ego and the non-ego” (p. 1). In short, if the child 
is to enter the symbolic, to acquire language and thereby identity, a form of 
primal differentiation and separation proves imperative. The expulsion of the 
abject – in whatever form threatens the nascent distinctness of the infant’s 
body, ego – is thus taken to be a necessary precondition of entry into the 
symbolic. 
Abjection thus provides “a sketch of that period which marks the 
threshold of the child’s acquisition of language and a relatively stable 
enunciative position” (Gross, 1990a, p. 86). The implication of this is that 
language, and perhaps most pertinently, the subject’s position within a 
designated ‘cultural symbolic’, is continually problematized by its previous 
existence, by an existence prior to an order of differentiation that a particular 
‘cultural symbolic’ has come to treat as primary. Always a function of likeness, 
a function of a prospective relation of intimacy that is continually disavowed, 
the abject is a part of the subject that must be continually dispelled but that 
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can never once and for all be destroyed; it hovers at the borders of a subject’s 
identity, “threatening apparent unities and stabilities with disruption and 
possible dissolution” (Gross, 1990a, p. 87). As Herbst (1999) emphasizes, the 
abject is only ‘peeled away’ from the subjectivity of the developing subject as 
a result of exclusions and prohibitions set in place by others. This point holds 
for the structural integrity of both the individual ego and of the cultural 
symbolic order in which that individual is located. The threat of the abject then 
is simultaneously: 1) a menace to the demarcations of the body, 2) an affront 
to the structural integrity of the ego, and, 3) a destabilization of the social and 
linguistic structuring systems of the subject. Abjection, as such is the 
underside of the symbolic, that which “the symbolic must reject, cover over 
and contain” (Gross, 1990a, p. 89). The abject’s disruption of the boundaries 
of identification hence occurs at different levels, and understandably so, given 
that ego-integrity is as much about bodily wholeness as it is about the location 
conferred by cultural symbolic structures of meaning. 
 
THE NERVOUS CONDITION OF DISCOURSE 
 
I have until now focussed mostly on the abject as it affects the ego and the 
body. It is important also to consider the role the abject plays in troubling and 
undermining the cultural symbolic, particularly so, given that it may be at this 
level that the impact of the abject is most acutely experienced. This is also a 
crucial point in how Kristeva’s theory helps us think about the analysis of 
racism. Kristeva does not simply overturn discursive accounts, preferring to 
focus solely on the ‘pre-discursive’ in the exclusive sense of what comes 
before discourse; her account is a description of the desperation of a cultural 
symbolic pushed to its limits, a theory, that is, about symbolic forces and the 
limitations and failings of a given discursive system which is beginning to 
come apart. The importance of this conceptualization is thus not merely about 
pointing out the limitations of the discursive frame, about ‘topping up’ a 
discursive account with reference to affective, bodily or pre-discursive 
elements of racism. Its importance lies in showing up how discourse is always 
locked into a relationship with ‘pre-discursive’ factors that provide a fuller 
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means of understanding the dynamics and limitations of discursive processes 
themselves. Let me develop this argument a little more slowly.  
As I have stressed above, the effects of abjection upon the subject 
cannot be localized exclusively within the domain of the ego. The ‘powers of 
horror’ of the abject are exerted more violently at that point of conjunction 
between ego and social law that we recognize as the superego. Kristeva 
(1982) expresses this point succinctly: “To each ego its object; to each 
superego its abject” (p. 2). The horror and sickness of the abject is thus not 
limited to that quantifiable object that vexes and disturbs the ego; it exerts 
itself even more dramatically upon the moral-political nerve-centre of the 
superego, each subject’s personalized guardian of the symbolic. The abject 
then is an attack on the network of discourses; on that ‘discursive sphere’ that 
makes up the cultural symbolic in which each speaking subject is placed. In 
this respect it starts to become clear that Kristeva’s is a social theory, a 
theory, in part, about the operation of discourse within a broader realm that 
includes extra-discursive elements. Incidentally, this concern with how the 
abject troubles the cultural symbolic sets Kristeva’s theorization apart from the 
typical ego-to-other line of analysis within which many psychoanalytic 
applications have attempted to fix the economy of racism (see critiques 
offered by Cohen, 2002; Dalal, 1998, 2001; Frosh, 1989). This is a useful 
point in playing up the shortcomings of psychoanalytic perspectives that 
neglect the structural and constitutive role of discursive practices, and that 
focus almost exclusively on the level of the ego when it comes to 
understanding the effects of racism (see Lane, 1998; Rustin, 1991; Žižek, 
1998 for criticism of such trends in psychoanalytic accounts of racism).  
Viewing racism as a variant of abjection means that we cannot analyse 
it at the isolated level of an individual’s psychological transactions with a field 
of objects. We must view racism rather in the context of a threat of the abject 
as posed to a cultural symbolic as a whole. If we grasp the point that the 
cultural symbolic itself is threatened, that it is in the convulsions of a crisis of 
its exclusionary ordering systems, then we understand something of the social 
force of racism that this theory illustrates. This is not to disconnect our 
discussion from the consideration of ‘pre-discursive’ factors of racism as 
realized in the domain of individual experience.  To the contrary, it is to plot a 
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line of continuity between these dimensions of abjection, to suggest (once 
again) that we need to focus on the relation between the structure of the 
cultural symbolic and the processes of abjection. These processes threaten 
the integrity and stability of the cultural symbolic at the same time that they 
provide it with the means of exclusion, demarcation and differentiation that 
prove to be a condition of its possibility. This relation between structure and 
process is best approached with reference to the limits of language. 
Language, like other instances of signification, is a chief instrument of 
differentiation and demarcation, and is hence of crucial importance in 
stabilizing that domain of boundaries, discrimination and difference that 
Kristeva (1982) understands as the symbolic. Abjection, by contrast, is the 
‘border-anxiety’ of a state that knows no such distinctions, no such order. The 
abject is that threat beyond words which plagues language, that which the 
ordering systems of the symbolic cannot contain or regularize. It confounds 
and destabilizes such symbolic systems, disenabling the sense-making 
mechanisms through which I – and the cultural symbolic of a given society – 
would claim a sense of security and stability. This is the danger that the abject 
poses to the ordering formation of a given discourse, and, at a higher level of 
abstraction, to the ordering systems of a particular cultural symbolic: such 
systems of demarcation and differentiation break down before the threat of a 
formlessness that cannot easily be objectified. Language is enlisted to contain 
the abject, to give it a temporary object status, but language always fails and 
must repeat its attempts at objectification, endlessly reiterating them in the 
echoing forms of the stereotype, the racist slur, in the fixity of the racial 
category (Bhabha, 1994; Hook, 2005b). Discourse as such, in the regularity of 
its categories, in the surety of its reiterated demarcations, is an ally in the 
attempt to fend off and objectify the abject even though such efforts never 
prove completely effective. This is why discursive forms of engagement are 
both absolutely crucial to the analysis of racism but also in and of themselves 
inadequate to the task. They are crucial because such symbolic attempts at 
containment - in language, in the codifications of a particular discourse, or in 
reference to the norms and ideals of the cultural symbolic - are elementary 
responses to the experience of abjection. Indeed, there is a great volume in 
the production of discourse precisely at those moments when the abject 
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seems to intrude. On the other hand, such discourse analytic approaches are 
also inadequate to the task at hand for they are not able to apprehend the 
other side of such discursive operations.  They are not able to grapple with 
those ‘pre-discursive’ processes which condition and augment every 
discursive action, which escape its codifications and drive the urgency of its 
attempts at containment. Bhabha’s (1994) characterization of the 
nervousness and continual anxiety of racist colonial discourse understands 
this point. To make such a point, importantly, is not to reduce discourse 
merely to a function of affect. It is to suggest rather that such a nervous 
condition is registered in particular discursive forms (the ambivalence of the 
colonial stereotype and of colonial mimicry for example (Bhabha, 1994)) and – 
more directly relevant to my concerns here - that discursive regularization 
sometimes gives way to different modalities of expression. 
 
THE CONSTITUTIVE OUTSIDE OF DISCOURSE 
 
In moments of abjection then we are concerned precisely with the failure of 
discourse – with the inability to adequately contain or regularize the abject 
within a given order of knowledge, law and representation. Given this crisis of 
formalization, we should be surprised neither that there is a great deal of 
discursive activity - attempts at repairing this crisis - or that such anxious 
responses of dread and aversion take on expressive forms that seemingly 
occur ‘before’ language. Such responses take on the route of ‘pre-discursive’ 
or symptomatic forms where the body returns in a field of forceful affects and 
aversions. These are the dimensions of threat and anxiety that discourse 
analysis cannot adequately fathom, ‘re-routings’ of social forms of hate that 
text-based critiques cannot adequately factor into their analyses. Such a 
dynamics of fear is too consuming to be grasped merely at the level of 
representational activity, signification or rhetorical rationality.  
Let us for the moment apply Kristeva’s theory as a means of 
understanding the potent forms of resistance that a given cultural symbolic 
system is capable of, that is, as a psychoanalytic theorization of the violent 
dynamics of discursive structures themselves. The notion of abjection, indeed, 
is an account that borrows from, or, more appropriately connects the registers 
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of the body and the ego to tell us something about the potent forms of 
response that are the resistances of a given system of structure whose overall 
cohesion and intelligibility seems under threat. Just as the individual subject 
asserts and consolidates an ego (and indeed, a bodily schema) on the basis 
of a variety of repulsions, exclusions and differentiations, so the cultural 
symbolic would seem to work as an ‘excluding machine’ that produces its 
structural integrity on the basis of what it ejects and repudiates. Here we 
might briefly pursue the image of the cultural symbolic as a discursive sphere: 
at the core of such a sphere we might expect to find a tight ideological 
nucleus binding its system of significations, laws and divisions. Such a 
gravitational field of values might be assumed to work in conjunction with a 
centripetal force, a boundary division, or better yet, a force field of norms and 
ideals that exerts a powerful outward charge on whatever appears to threaten 
the structure and integrity of the whole. What works on the level of the body, it 
seems, works also on the level of the ego, and on the level of the social 
formation: in each case a violent repulsion operating with the immediacy and 
urgency of a reflex action that consolidates a particular order of structure.  
We may even press this metaphor further: if such a discursive sphere 
exerts a continual centripetal force against that which does not fit its system, 
then might we not assume that these outward forces play their part in 
reinforcing the structural integrity of the sphere as a whole? Those elements 
which do not fit its system, which oppose its values would seem to play a vital 
role in holding this discursive sphere in place, securing its cohesion and 
ensuring the rigidity of its internal structures and divisions. If this is the case 
then we are confronted with a different relationship of dependence than we 
may have expected. If the discursive sphere of the cultural symbolic needs 
what it excludes to ensure that it assumes a regular and intact form, if it is 
exactly this constitutive outside that determines its shape, then any given 
discursive sphere would seem to be reliant on precisely what it cannot 
assimilate, namely its abjects. These extra-discursive elements, best 
understood here as the ‘pre-discursive’ factors of racism, would thus appear 
to function as a condition of possibility for the discursive (much in the sense 
that the symbolic follows on from the semiotic); they would be the ‘limit forms’ 
that determine the contours of a given discursive sphere.  
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 Returning to a more applied focus on the analysis of racism, we might 
suggest that discursive and ‘pre-discursive’ factors need be examined 
together for the simple reason that each forms the other’s ‘constitutive 
outside’. Most certainly, the extra-discursive here might be understood as that 
conditioning, attendant and menacing force – a kind of primal anxiety of 
formlessness and dissolution – that shadows all discourse, shaping and 
driving the imperatives of discursive production. What the production of 
discourse offers, by contrast, is a measure of protection – via its abilities of 
differentiation, categorization and symbolic containment - against the bodily 
disturbances, ego anxieties and threats of structural/social disintegration that 
the abject brings. The analysis of racist discourse as such would seem to 
proceed best in conjunction with the scrutiny of those ‘pre-discursive’ 
elements that condition its limits and with which it remains in a constant and 
dynamic relation of tension and incommensurability. The scrutiny of such ‘pre-
discursive’ elements may guide us to the weak-points of the discourse in 
question, helping to show up its areas of utmost density and vulnerability, its 
areas of blockage and ‘unspeakability’. Not only might such an approach mark 
out where the affective loading of such discourses is at their greatest – 
directing us to its particular moments of anxiety and repetition and hopefully 
opening up possibilities for subversion along the way - it might also focus 
attentions on those points of conjunction where racisms of discourses connect 
most forcibly to racisms of the body and of the ego. 
 
REGISTERS OF BODY, EGO, SYMBOLIC 
 
What the theory of abjection helps us grasp then about the social 
operationalization of hate is that any subject category that comes to occupy 
the position of abject will exert a three-part threat experienced at each of the 
associated levels of the body, ego and cultural symbolic. One might note in 
this respect how an analytics of abjection exposes the prospective limitations 
of psychoanalytic and discourse analytic approaches alike, certainly inasmuch 
as they focus their attentions exclusively on the level of ego disturbances or 
symbolic activities, respectively. The fear and loathing of abjection cannot be 
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consigned to any one of these dimensions of sociality; we are concerned here 
rather with a nervousness of multiple dimensions that reverberates across a 
series of interlinked registers of experience. What this suggests is that racist 
sentiments may be said to persist in subliminal (pre-symbolic, bodily, 
affective) forms even after they have been confronted at the level of explicit 
discursive consciousness. Not only is it the case then that discursive forms of 
racism may be re-routed, given alternative expressive form. It is also possible 
that once rejected, such discursive sentiments might be rehabilitated at ‘pre-
discursive’ levels; consolidated via the means of bodily and symptomatic 
experience; re-enacted and affected in modes of aversion and reactivity that 
motivate for discursive formalization. If this is the case, as Young (1990a) 
argues that it is, urging us to pay more attention to those structures of 
oppression lying beneath discursive awareness, then the censure and 
analysis of racist discourse will, in and of itself, prove an inadequate strategy 
of anti-racist politics.  
We need cast our analytic net widely enough to identify a series of 
distinct but overlapping modes of racism. A base, visceral racism of the body, 
firstly, invested with anxieties about physical proximity with ‘racial others’, 
fantasies of contamination, obsessions with bodily difference. This is a racism 
of the flesh, in short, replete with symptomatic expressions and affects, a 
reviling of the other on a ‘pre-discursive’ basis. Secondly, an interpersonal 
racism: a racism of ego and object, a mode of subjectification best grasped 
with reference to a series of psychological operations (such as those of 
projection, splitting, disavowal, identification and so on (for an overview see 
Clarke, 1999, 2003)). This, it would seem, is a properly psychological 
dimension of racism, at least inasmuch as we are concerned with forms of 
racism that have been tied into those ego operations dedicated to possessing 
a stable, clearly delineated and separable structure of identity. Never merely 
psychological in nature, we need view racism here, following Frosh (1989) as  
 
something deeply embedded in the psychology of the individual racist… [Indeed] social 
forces do not operate solely on the structural plane, but become inextricably bound up 
with the subjective experience of individuals, which in turn contribute to their 
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perpetuation…[Racism] achieves part of its power through being inscribed deeply in 
individual psychology (p. 210). 
 
Racism as it is generated and sustained at the level of trans-individual 
systems of the cultural symbolic, thirdly; the dynamics of abjection are felt 
here also. Our priority in this respect lies in tracking this disturbance as it is 
realized in the dimension of ideological force, as it is factored into regimes of 
representation, knowledge and social practice. We will not be surprised here 
to find that racism takes on a moral character, a near metaphysical quality: 
the ‘racial other’ and all their assumed attributes comes to represent a series 
of cultural violations. One might speculate here as to the quasi-religious 
nature of racism – as Kristeva (1982) does in the case of Anti-Semitism – in 
which the ‘racial other’ is not merely offensive in respect of their body, mind 
and culture, but is thoroughly repugnant in view of the positive assault they 
represent to the moral order of the (racist) world. The ‘orb of abjection’ notes 
Kristeva (1982), spreads across the social sphere of morality, religion, politics 
and culture. 
 This is not simply to make the routine observation that racism can be 
analyzed at a variety of different levels of sociality. It is rather to suggest that 
critical social psychology requires a theory that is able to connect and 
conceptualize how such dimensions of racist subjectivity may work in powerful 
arrangements of combination – or no less potent arrangements of mutual 
tension and contradiction – so as to produce something of the persistence 
that makes racism such an obdurate social formation. 
This returns us to the question of the rapprochement of discursive and 
psychoanalytic approaches in the analysis of racism. If we are to effectively 
grapple with the complex relationship between subjects and their symbolic 
structures as it is realized in racism, what is required is not merely a more 
historicized version of psychoanalytic critique. This is not just a case of 
aligning psychoanalysis and discourse analysis such that we are better able 
to track psychological mechanisms in talk, or to view psychoanalytic 
processes as enacted in language (Billig, 1999; Georgaca, in press; Riggs & 
Augoustinos, 2004) although, I hasten to add, these are certainly important 
critical strategies. I would suggest that what is more urgently required in the 
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study of racism is attention to a psychoanalytic theory of the functioning of 
racist discourse itself, that is, an awareness of the ‘affective economy’ of 
racist discourse and how it is held in place, conditioned by, and always 
involved in a dynamic relation with those bodily, affective and pre-symbolic 
components that I have referred to as ‘pre-discursive’. 
Here then the nub of my argument: although ‘pre-discursive’ symptoms 
are qualitatively different from their discursive correlates, they remain 
inseparable from them, an integral part of their mechanics of operation. Such 
processes make up the ‘constitutive outside’ of discursive formalization; these 
after all are the factors that discourse struggles to cover over and to contain: 
the anxieties, visceral and symptomatic reactions that requires the alleviation 
of being put into words. Unless we are able to take such ‘pre-discursive’ 
factors into account, to see how they underwrite and often exert a driving 
influence upon racist patterns of signification, we do not appreciate the full 
virulence, indeed, the full volatility of racist discourse. We do not adequately 
understand the ways in which racist discourse combines with forces of the 
body, or the ways in which it links to the most desperate mechanisms of 
subjectivity and ego constitution. We do not, in short, adequately understand 
the ‘pre-discursive’ (affective, bodily) economy of racist discourse itself. 
The ultimate incommensurability of bodily experience to words is one 
way of understanding the limitations of discourse analysis when it comes to 
racism; the same might be said of the incommensurability of abjection to 
symbolic/discursive means of containment. These points of failure, where 
representational or symbolic means of analysis are elided by a visceral, ‘pre-
discursive’ or bodily set of responses should be taken as nodal points in the 
analysis of racism. Indeed, it is exactly these points of failure that we need to 
bring into analytical visibility if we are to adequately grapple with the tenacity 
of racism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have attempted above to draw attention to the limitations of exclusively 
discursive accounts of racism and to underline the need to involve ‘pre-
discursive’ factors in critical social psychological accounts of racism. We need 
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to be able to engage those forms of racism that evade the rules of discourse, 
grapple with a racism of powerful affective responses, embodied experience, 
of pre-symbolic reactivity. Kristeva’s notion of abjection assists us in this 
respect. It helps us theorize the role of the body in racism, warning us not to 
neglect the domain of physicality, perhaps especially so when discursive 
forms of racism appear to be in retreat. To be sure, the body never ‘falls out’ 
of racism; on the contrary, it is just such a nervous body, the body of 
racialized aversions and dreads that may motivate and underlie many more 
overtly discursive formulations of racism. One might refer in this respect to the 
‘sensuality’ of racism that Fanon (1952) understood so well: phobias of racial 
proximity/contact; anxious visceral reactions to the physical presence of racial 
others; the heightened bodily sense of the ‘getting under the skin’ 
(‘epidermalization’) of racial markers which succeed in overdetermining the 
subject from without. In the notion of abjection we have a theory of 
embodiment able to understand a form of racism that is played through, and 
substantiated by, the body’s economy of separations and distinctions. We 
have, moreover, a conceptualization able to grasp a mode of racism that is 
routed through affective channels and that maintains powerful links to death, 
the corporeal limits of the subject, and the constitution of identity. 
 Pertinent here too are issues of the emotional and ideological intensity 
with which racist identity is formed, questions, that is, of racism at its most 
affective, irrational and imaginative. The notion of abjection provides an 
explanatory perspective on both the extremity of affect and the virulence of 
response that that accompanies many of the starkest instances of racial 
hatred. The fact that abjection is always in part action, reflexive or reactive 
response helps us understand something of racism’s immanent relation to 
expressivity, it also helps explain why many forms of racism seem forever 
poised on the brink of demonstrative acts and potential violences, symbolic or 
otherwise. The vehemence and desperation of much racism is likewise played 
up by the theory of abjection inasmuch as it stresses that the threat the abject 
embodies is typically that of the subject’s dissolution: what is at stake here is 
the subject’s constitution as a coherent and distinctive body, ego and 
symbolic entity. 
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By understanding the operations of abjection as a force-field that 
maintains the coherence of the ego – a coherence doubly supported by 
symbolic structure and bodily parameters – Kristeva provides an impressive 
linkage between the registers of the body, the ego and the cultural symbolic. 
This enables us to think the interconnection of ‘bodily’ racism, the racism of 
personal identity and the symbolic racism of social and discursive structures. 
Racism as such has more than one rallying domain, and functions, 
characteristically, in a complex combination of forms that lends it an almost 
uncanny tenacity. What this means – and here the gist of Butler’s (1993) 
Foucauldian contribution to Kristeva’s theory – is that abjection is not simply a 
primal process of bodily and ego differentiation, but equally a top-down 
production of power through which the structures of a given society are 
affirmed and solidified through the systematic generation of a class of 
disqualified abject subjects. 
I am aware that such extended reference to processes of abjection 
risks an insidious naturalization of racism. In much the same vein, I am 
conscious that this theory might be read as supplying an underlying 
bodily/biological (and hence essentialized) grounds for racist behaviour. It is 
hence worth reiterating again that there are no essential or fixed abject 
‘objects’: those ‘subjects’ or ‘zones of uninhabitability’, which come to count as 
abject are, as Butler (1993) insists, socially prescribed. ‘Race’, or racialized 
categories themselves – as would seem clear – have no necessary 
relationship to the dynamics of abjection. To be quite clear: the theory of 
abjection cannot be used to motivate for a natural/‘pre-discursive’ basis for the 
differences that a particular discursive regime comes to treat as primary in its 
differentiation of subjects. As Young (1990a) insists, the notion of abjection 
does not explain how that considered abject initially came to assume such a 
position. Explanations of this sort seem better served by the historical, 
sociological and constructionist perspectives that I would argue the theory of 
abjection serves to compliment. Explanations of the dynamics of abjection, by 
contrast, are better equipped to tell us about how the social differentiations 
prioritised by a cultural symbolic come to be enacted along potent pre-
symbolic, affective and bodily routes of experience. 
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My descriptive attempts at explaining aspects of racism should not, 
furthermore, be taken as attempts at ‘explaining away’, as an insidious 
justification of such modes of reaction. Whereas the ‘dynamics of hate’, 
practices of exclusion, rejection, repulsion and so on, may be considered 
trans-historical, unavoidable factors of human existence, racism itself cannot. 
If the theory of abjection essentializes anything, it essentializes the dynamics 
of disgust, revulsion and exclusion, the processes of expulsion and division 
that, admittedly, it views as universal and integral aspects of human 
experience. While such operations of repulsion may be viewed as intrinsic 
and necessary features of subject formation, this cannot be said of racism. 
This is a crucial distinction: it is the difference between assuming the 
inevitability of racism as a form of defense and ego-constitution common to all 
humans, and the injunction to examine the particular ways in which distinctive 
forms of hate come to be socially operationalized. 
It is perhaps worth reiterating here that the threat of the abject needs 
by no means be referenced in a ‘real’ objective state of affairs; indeed, this 
object-less threat radiates not from any intrinsic qualities of whatever or 
whoever is considered abject, but rather from a system’s (body, ego, cultural 
symbolic) attempt to consolidate its own wholeness/autonomy/purity. I note 
this simply so as to guard against what might be read as an implication of my 
description above, namely that the responses of abjection – and by extension, 
those of racism - are somehow justified, given the threat experienced in 
moments of abjection. This threat is best read in conjunction with the 
psychoanalytic notion of fantasy, with the proviso that despite the depth of 
affect that it is capable of incurring, its basis in reality is often at best slight. 
I would suggest, in view of the possible points of slippage discussed 
above (racism as ‘natural system’, the threat of the abject as somehow 
justified) that we take the precaution of viewing abjection as a technology of 
affect. This denaturalizes racism, emphasizing that there may well be certain 
routings of affect that seem to exist prior to the intervention of social and 
symbolic meaning – these are not after all primarily discursive operations – 
but that are certainly amenable to the exploitation of various political and 
discursive systems which are themselves reinforced in the process. Abjection 
as such makes for a particularly potent route for the ideological operation of 
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racism precisely because of its affective and ostensible ‘pre-social’ or 
‘unmediated’ nature, because of the fact that it is taken to be non-discursive, 
immune to the ideological gravity of social processes. This is indeed a 
pernicious technology, a technology of bodily and psychological differentiation 
mechanisms (the co-ordination of an ‘operation of repulsion’ to recall Butler’s 
phrase), which functions in a virtually instinctual capacity to affirm and 
substantiate structures of the body, of identity and of the cultural symbolic.  
As is clear then, the theory of abjection does not simply play the part of 
a complement to discursive accounts – filling in their gaps by exploring more 
fully the affective, bodily, personalized elements of racism – it is also the case 
that abjection is itself a mean of producing ideological effects, by which I 
mean to say that it provides another means of ‘encoding’, operationalizing, 
indeed affecting processes and meanings of racial hatred and exclusion. As 
Kristeva puts it: “Abjection, when all is said and done, is the other facet of 
religious, moral and ideological codes on which rests the sleep of individuals 
and the breathing spells of societies” (1982, p. 209). 
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